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We report the results of two experiments investigating conditional inferences from
conditional unless assertions, such as Juan is not in León unless Nuria is in Madrid.
Experiments 1 and 2 check Fillenbaum’s hypothesis about the semantic similarity of
unless with if not and only if assertions; both also examine inferential endorsements
(Experiment 1) and endorsements and latencies (Experiment 2) of the four logically
equivalent conditional formulations: if A then B, if not-B then not-A, A only if B and not-
A unless B. The results of these experiments show the similarity of unless and only if,
confirming that the representation of both conditionals from the outset probably include
two possibilities directionally oriented from B to A; results also confirm the especial
difficulty of unless assertions. The implications of the results are discussed in the context
of recent psychological and linguistic theories of the meaning of unless.
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Se presentan los resultados de dos experimentos que investigan las inferencias a partir
de enunciados condicionales a menos  que, tales como “Juan no está en León a menos
que Nuria esté en Madrid”. Los experimentos 1 y 2 comprueban la hipótesis de Fillenbaum
sobre la similaridad semántica de los enunciados a menos que con si no y sólo si; ambos
experimentos examinan las respuestas inferenciales (Experimento 1) y las respuestas
inferenciales y  las latencias (Experimento 2) de las cuatro formulaciones condicionales
lógicamente equivalentes: si A entonces B, si no-B entonces no-A, A sólo si B y no-A a
menos que B. Los resultados muestran la similaridad de a menos que y sólo si,
confirmando que la representación de ambos condicionales probablemente incluya desde
el principio dos posibilidades orientadas direccionalmente desde B a A; los resultados
también confirman la dificultad especial de las afirmaciones del tipo a menos  que. Las
implicaciones de los resultados se comentan en el contexto de las teorías psicológicas
y lingüísticas sobre el significado de a menos  que.
Palabras clave: condicionales, razonamiento proposicional, modelos mentales
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Our aim is to examine some linguistic and psychological
hypotheses about the meaning of unless conditionals by
using conditional inference tasks. First, we outline a mental
model theory of conditional reasoning and consider the
possibilities people keep in mind to understand if then and
if not then conditionals; we suggest that they represent only
one of the possibilities from the outset to understand if then
and if not then. Second, we examine the possibilities they
think about in understanding only if conditionals and suggest
that they represent two of the possibilities from the outset
to understand them. Third, we review linguistic and
psychological theories and evidence regarding unless and
consider the possibilities people think about to understand
this connective. We report two experiments that compare
unless with if then, if not then and only if. 
During the last four decades a great deal of psychological
research has been devoted to propositional reasoning,
particularly to conditionals. The study of how people reason
from conditional statements has become the main concern
of research in deductive reasoning (see, Evans, Newstead,
& Byrne, 1993). Four main theoretical approaches have
been posited in propositional reasoning. Mental rules theories
claim that the reasoning process is based on the application
of formal rules of inference (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998;
Rips, 1994). There is also a view claiming that conditional
reasoning is based on domain-specific rules of inference
(e.g., Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000; Holyoak & Cheng,
1995). The third approach, mental model theories, maintains
that reasoning processes rely on the ability to imagine
possibilities (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002; see also Evans, 1993). The fourth
view, related with mental models approach but neatly
distinct, has been recently proposed by Evans and
collaborators (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, Over, & Handley,
2005). This view claims that the meaning of conditionals is
represented by means of epistemic mental models that
include not only the states of world but also “states of belief
and knowledge” (Evans, in press). This paper is not aimed
to contribute to the debate between diverse theories but to
advance understanding about reasoning with unless and its
meaning, from the mental model approach.
Most psychological work on conditionals has been
centered on checking reasoners’ abilities on three different
experimental paradigms: the truth table task, Wason’s
selection task and the inferential rules task. The latter
paradigm requires participants to construct or evaluate
conclusions from the application of four conditional rules:
modus ponens (MP), denial of antecedent (DA),
affirmation of the consequent (AC), and modus tollens
(MT) (see Table 1). 
The studies reported here have been carried out from
the perspective of mental model theory and have not aimed
to contribute to the debate between mental rules and models.
We will present some new empirical data using the
inferential rules task to compare people’s ability to reason
with different conditional linguistic formulations. 
Conditional Reasoning and Mental Model Theory
The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991,
2002) holds that reasoning depends on the semantic
processes of constructing and manipulating possibilities or
models of sentences. Mental model theory of conditional
reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) holds that people’s
reasoning may be explained according to two main
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Table 1
The Truth Conditions for the Four Linguistic Forms and the Four Inferences from Them
If A then B A only if B If not-B not-A Not-A unless B  
Truth conditions
A and B True True True True
not-A and not-B True True True True
not-A and B True True True True
A and not-B False False False False
Inferences
MP A...B A...B not-B...not-A A...B
AC B...A B...A not-A...not-B B...A
MT not-B...not-A not-B...not-A A...B not-B...not-A
DA not-A...not-B not-A...not-B B...A not-A...not-B
Note. MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent, MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of antecedent. Naming the four
inferences for unless is difficult and we have been guided by the form of the minor premise and conclusion, as well as by the possibilities
that are true and false. For not-A unless B, the three true possibilities are A and B, not-A and not-B, and not-A and B. The two logically
valid inferences are A therefore B, and not-B therefore not-A. The two fallacies are not-A therefore not-B, and B therefore A. We call
these inferences MP, MT, DA and AC respectively, although we accept that at first sight it may seem odd to use MP to refer to the
inference Not-A unless B, A therefore B. Other naming schemes run into difficulties, however, and so we opt for this one.
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principles. First, the principle of truth affirms that people
keep in mind true possibilities or models, for example, for
if A then B: A and B, not-A and B, and not-A and not-B;
but not false possibilities, for example, A and not-B. The
second principle maintains that in order not to overload
working memory, people represent as little information as
possible explicitly (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-
Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). Thus, when reasoning
from a conditional assertion such as if A then B, people keep
in mind at the outset just the possibility mentioned in the
conditional, A and B (see Table 2). If required, people may
flesh out the representation of conditionals in order to make
possibilities fully explicit:
A B 
not-A B
not-A not-B
This representation of conditional assertions corresponds
to a material implication or one-way interpretation of
conditionals. However, people frequently interpret if then
statements as two-way conditionals or bi-conditionals. The
initial representation of the material equivalence reading of
if then assertions is the same as the one-way conditional.
The only difference is that now the fully fleshed out
possibilities are as follows:
A B 
not-A not-B
Two of the model theory’s main assumptions worth
mentioning here are: First, the greater the number of explicit
possibilities that reasoners have to keep in mind, the harder
the task will be. Second, reasoning problems that can be
solved from the initial possibilities of premises will be easier
than those that demand a further fleshing out of the
possibilities (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Mental model theory has precise predictions for the four
rules of inference that have been traditionally posited from
conditional assertions (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 2002;
see also Evans, 1993). The Modus Ponens (MP) rule of
inference states that from the conditional statement if A then
B and the categorical premise:
There is an A
the conclusion there is a B may be drawn. The situation
represented in the categorical premise corresponds with the
possibility people keep in mind initially when they interpret
if then conditional assertions. Therefore, this inference will
be easy since the conclusion can be directly extracted from
this initial model. 
A second valid conditional inference is Modus Tollens
(MT). Now the categorical premise is:
There is not a B
and yields the conclusion there is not an A. The categorical
premise eliminates the initial possibility, whose realization
demands a fleshing out of models. Some reasoners are not
going to make this more demanding working memory task
and so erroneously conclude nothing follows. Others will
go on thinking and build up a complete representation, in
which the categorical premise corresponds to the situation
described in the last model not-A not-B. This model clearly
permits drawing out the not-A conclusion. MT inferences
will obviously be harder since they require the extra
cognitive work of fleshing out the models. These two
inferences are valid for one-way conditionals as well as for
biconditionals. The other two rules of inference, on the other
hand, are valid only for biconditional interpretations. In the
Affirmation of Consequent (AC), the categorical premise is:
There is a B
and the conclusion, there is an A, may be drawn from the
first explicit model. 
With the Denial of Consequent (DA) the categorical
premise is:
There is not an A
and then the conclusion there is not a B requires one to
flesh out the models, as in MT inferences. Hence mental
model theory predicts that people will draw more AC
inferences than DA ones. 
When comparing MP and AC inferences, we see that they
both allow the conclusion to be drawn from the initial
representation. However, AC inferences are not valid for
conditional interpretations, that is, they can be falsified by a
full fleshing out of models: the model not-A B impedes the
drawing of AC inference (B, then A). Moreover, AC inferences
require reasoning in the direction opposite to the one in which
the information from the conditional statement entered working
memory (see, Evans, 1993; Johnson-Laird et al., 1992). Evans
Table 2
The Possibilities Reasoners Keep in Mind Initially when they
Interpret the Four Linguistic Conditionals Formulations
If A then B A and B
If not-B then not-A not-B and not-A
A only if B B and A
not-B and not-A
Not-A unless B not-B and not-A
B and A
Note. The full set of true possibilities for each of the four linguistic
forms is the same: A and B, not-A and not-B, and not-A and B. 
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holds that “subjects are inclined to focus attention on the part
of the rule- antecedent or consequent- that is modified by the
if then and reason from that component to the other” (1993,
p. 9). A directional bias of this kind was proposed by model
theory in syllogistic reasoning to account for the figural effect
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) and has also been applied to
propositional reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken,
1992). This directional bias, however, does not affect MP
inferences, which can in addition be drawn from both
conditional and biconditional interpretations. Therefore, the
theory additionally predicts that MP inferences will be more
frequent than AC ones, even in bi-conditionals in which the
AC inferences are valid.
A relatively early result in the study of conditional
inferences was that the basic difference in difficulty between
MP and MT inferences tended to disappear when using A
only if B conditional formulations (Evans, 1977; Evans &
Beck, 1981). Mental model theory, following Braine (1978),
developed an explanation that accounts for this result. Johnson-
Laird and Byrne (1991) proposed that only if assertions lead
from the start to two explicit representations (or models).
They suggested people would have in mind from the outset
two possibilities for A only if B conditionals as follows:
A B
not-A not-B
From this initial representation, reasoners can readily
make both MP and MT. But, there are two empirical results
that go against this explanation: First, people should make
more DA from only if than from if, and they do not. Second,
Evans (1977; Evans & Beck, 1981; see also Evans, Clibbens,
& Rood, 1995) found that AC inferences were more frequent
with only if conditionals than with if then ones. Evans (1993)
holds that this increase in AC inferences could be explained
by a directional bias produced by the order in which people
build up the models. In order to explain both the lack of
difference between MP and MT inferences for only if and
if then assertions, and the increase of AC inferences for only
if, Evans (1993; see also Santamaría & Espino, 2002; Grosset
& Barrouillet, 2003) proposed that reasoners keep a single
possibility in mind for A only if B but in the direction B
and A, and thus have a processing preference for making
inferences in accordance with this direction, from B to A.
However, on this account reasoners should make fewer MT
than AC from only if, and they do not. 
In order to account for these two main empirical results,
we have proposed an explanation that combines some aspects
of other studies (Carriedo, García-Madruga, Moreno, &
Gutiérrez, 1999; Egan, Byrne, & García-Madruga, 2007;
García-Madruga, Gutiérrez, Carriedo, Moreno, & Johnson-
Laird, 2002; García-Madruga, Moreno, Quelhas & Juhos,
2007). This proposal suggests that reasoners understand only
if by thinking about two possibilities or models, as proposed
by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), but in the directional
way proposed by Evans (1993). Thus, understanding A only
if B would imply the construction of the two mental
possibilities: B and A and not-B and not-A (see Table 2). 
Finally, one problem in conditional inferences remains
to be analyzed before turning to unless sentences: the negated
conditionals. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) proposed that
the initial representation of negative conditionals would
include the affirmative propositions. So, for instance, a
conditional assertion with a negative consequent, such as:
If A, then not-B
will be represented with the following initial models:
A not-B
B
This kind of representation, suggested by the use of denial
in language to correct misconceptions (Wason, 1965), has a
basic advantage. It permits one to account for an important
phenomenon found in truth tables and in Wason’s selection
task: the matching bias. However, the proposal of including
the affirmative cases in the initial representation of
conditionals cannot explain the results in conditional
inferences. Therefore, Evans (1993; Evans, Clibbens, & Rood,
1996; Evans & Handley, 1999; Evans, Legrenzi, & Girotto,
1999) has proposed that there would be no difference between
the representation of conditionals with and without a negative.
Only the antecedent (positive or negative) and the consequent
(positive or negative) are represented in the initial models.
Hence, we will use this representation for negated
conditionals throughout this paper (see Table 2). 
An interesting result of research on negative if
conditionals is that when using abstract materials there is a
negative conclusion or double negation bias: Reasoners will
make fewer affirmative inferences when their conclusion is
an affirmative resulting from the denial of a negative (Evans
et al., 1996; Evans & Handley, 1999; Evans et al., 1998;
see also Schaeken & Schroyens, 2000; Schroyens, Schaeken,
& D’Ydewalle, 2001). So, for instance, in a conditional in
which the antecedent and consequent are negated, as in if
not-B then not-A sentences we use in our experiments, the
affirmative conclusions MT (A then B) and DA (B then A)
will be more difficult: Both inferences demand the denial
of an already negated term (MT: A then not not-B; DA: B
then not not-A).
Unless Conditionals
Unless sentences are used in daily life and they occur
in the pragmatic context of conditional warnings and threats
(see Fillenbaum, 1976, 1986), for example:
You will not have an ice-cream unless you finish the meat.
Do not travel by car unless you take along chains. 
Unless is a negative conditional connective directly
related with if not then (see Quine, 1972; Reichenbach,
1947). In fact, from a logical point of view, an if A then B
conditional assertion is equivalent to an if not-B then not-
A conditional, and the latter could be correctly phrased with
unless as: not-A, unless B.
Following Geis (1973) however, linguists offer
compelling arguments against the identification of unless
with if not (see, Dancygier, 1998, 2002; Declerck & Reed,
2000; Lycan, 2001). Geis holds that the meaning of unless
is more similar to except if than to if not (see also von Fintel,
1991). In a similar way, Fillenbaum (1976, 1986), in trying
to explain both the intimate relationship between unless and
if not and their differences, proposed only if as the preferred
understanding for unless sentences. So, the phrasing of the
prior assertion using an only if formulation will be: A only
if B (see Table 2). Other psychologists and linguists agree
with the tight relationship between only if and unless
conditionals (see for instance, Clark & Clark, 1977;
Montolío, 1999). 
There are few psychological studies of reasoning with
unless. Wright and Hull (1986, 1988) carried out a series
of experiments as to how people understand declarative
sentences with unless and how they process instructions that
include this conditional connective. Two of their ideas and
results of their work deserve to be mentioned here. 
First, Wright and Hull (1986, 1988) found a different
pattern of results for unless and if not then, thereby
confirming the differences between these two conditionals.
Second, following Fillenbaum’s proposals, they considered
that the illocutionary force of unless is more similar to only
if than to if not then. For example, if we choose a threatening
sentence such as:
You will not have an ice-cream unless you finish the meat.
The illocutionary force of this sentence is focused on
the desirability of the protasis (to finish the meat). This
strong emphasis is partially lost when we use an equivalent
if not then formulation:
If you don’t finish the meat then you will not have an
ice-cream.
On the contrary, if we consider an only if formulation:
You will have an ice-cream only if you finish the meat.
the main clause (to have an ice-cream) has lost its
negative character, even though the strong emphasis of
desirability on the need to finish the meat remains. 
Semantic similarity between unless and only if was also
confirmed in a preliminary study by Schaeken, García-
Madruga, and d’Ydewalle (1997), although these authors
found that solving conditional inferences with unless was
harder than with only if. The special difficulty of unless
conditionals results mainly from their tendency to produce
asymmetric conclusions, while this is not the case for only
if. As an example of these kind of asymmetric responses,
some people gave the incorrect response B to the following
set of premises: not-A unless B, and not-A (DA inference).
Schaeken et al. maintain that a hypothetical explanation
could be that these reasoners were using a shortcut strategy
that consists of matching the two terms that appear in the
statement. As we can see, Schaeken et al.’s results confirm
Fillenbaum’s hypothesis about the semantic similarity
between unless and only if by constructing from the outset
the same two models. However, the construction of the two
initial models seems to be harder for unless than for only
if as the asymmetric responses show.
In order to give account of prior evidence, we have
proposed a two-initial-model representation for unless similar
to that of only if (see table 2) (Carriedo et al., 1999; García-
Madruga, Moreno, et al., 2002). We are not claiming that
only if and unless sentences mean exactly the same thing.
There is an obvious difference in the use of polarity between
them: only if is affirmative, and unless is negative. In fact,
in Spanish, unless sentences can be expressed indistinctly
by “a menos que” and “a no ser que,” both expressions are
relatively usual in Spanish, although “a menos que” tends
to be more formal (see Montolío, 1999).  The experiments
of this paper used “a menos que.” Related to the negative
polarity of unless is its counter-expectancy nature (see
Montolío, 1999, p. 3709). The previous threatening sentence,
You will not have an ice-cream unless you finish the meat,
does not imply a high expectancy by the speaker of the
addressee finishing the meat and thereby getting the ice-
cream (the affirmative possibility B and A). The aim of this
work, however, is not to study these differences but to check
the hypothesis of a similar core meaning by using an
inference task with abstract conditionals. 
Experiment 1
The objective of this experiment was to compare people’s
reasoning with the four logically equivalent conditional
formulations: If A then B, If not-B then not-A, A only if B
and Not-A unless B, by means of a within-subjects design
that allowed a complete comparison between the four
conditionals statements. 
As we analyzed above, people build only one initial
possibility or model for if and if not whereas they construct
two models for only if and unless. Besides, we have
proposed that the two model initial representation for only
if and unless is backward, from B to A (see Table 2). From
these assumptions we make our three main predictions: 
1. There will be differences in accuracy between MP
and MT inferences for if then and if not then
statements, since MT cannot be drawn from the initial
model. On the other hand, we predict no differences
between MP and MT inferences for unless and only
if since both inferences can be drawn from the initial
representation. 
2. The two model backward initial representation of
unless and only if conditionals will yield an increase
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in MT and AC inferences in comparison with if then
and if not then statements. 
As for DA inferences, we do not predict any increase
for unless and only if conditionals in comparison with
if then and if not then statements: The initial
representation of the negated possibility (not-B and
not-A) should facilitate DA inference, but this
tendency can be cancelled out by the directional bias
(from B to A).
3. Finally, given the special difficulty of unless
statements checked in prior studies, we predict that
reasoners will tend to give some asymmetric
conclusions with unless formulations. This kind of
responses is not predicted for the other conditional
formulations. 
Method
Participants
Thirty-two third year psychology students from a class
at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
(UNED) in Madrid voluntarily participated in the experiment
for course credit. The participants had received no training
in logic and had not been previously tested in any experiment
in reasoning. Six participants were replaced because they
incorrectly answered all four questions in at least two
conditions.
Materials
A list of 70 problems with different types of conditionals
were created. Six of the 70 were presented as practice items
and the other 64 were presented as experimental items: 16
sentences corresponding to if A then B, 16 to if not-B then
not-A, 16 to not-A unless B, and the other 16 to A only if
B. The six practice problems consisted of one for if and if
not and two for only if and unless conditionals; there were
one example of MP and AC inferences and two examples
of DA and MT inferences. Participants did not receive any
feedback after practice problems. 
The lexical content of the problems referred to the
locations of letters on one side of a card and numbers on
the other side of a card. The lexical form of each type of
conditional statement was as follows:
If there is a P on one side, there is a 1 on the other side.
(In Spanish: “Si hay una P por un lado, hay un 1 por el
otro lado”).
If there is not a 1 on one side, there is not a P on the
other side. (In Spanish: “Si no hay un 1 por un lado, no
hay una P por el otro lado”).
There is not a P on one side, unless there is a 1 on the
other side. (In Spanish: “No hay una P por un lado, a
menos que haya un 1 por el otro lado”).
There is a P on one side only if there is a 1 on the other
side. (In Spanish: “Hay una P por un lado sólo si hay
un 1 por el otro lado”).
For each statement, letters and numbers were randomized,
so participants were never exposed to the same letter-number
combination. Each type of conditional occurred four times,
corresponding to the MP inference, 4 MT, 4 DA and 4 AC.
The negative minor premises were explicit negations, for
example, If there is a P on one side, there is a 1 on the
other side, There is not a P on one side (DA).
Design
Participants acted as their own controls. Each subject
had to respond to 64 conditionals problems in which there
were 4 types of conditional statements—if A then B, if not-
B then not-A, not-A unless B, and A only if B—and 4 types
of inferences: MP, AC, MT, and DA. Thus a 4 × 4 within-
subjects design was used.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a single session
lasting approximately an hour. The instructions explained
the nature of the task. Participants were told that they had
to state what, if anything, followed necessarily from each
set of premises, i.e., what must be true given that the
premises were true. If the participants considered that nothing
followed from the premises, then they had to write that
nothing follows. The entire procedure, including all
instructions, was controlled by a Macintosh computer.
Participants sat in front of a video display screen on
which the written information appeared in black capital
letters on a white screen. After having read carefully the
instructions, and completed the practice trials, one of the
four kinds of conditional sentences appeared on the screen.
Participants had to read the sentence and press the space
bar in order to change the display. Then the categorical
premise appeared on the screen in one of the MP, MT, DA
or AC variants. Participants, after reading the categorical
premise, had to press the space bar, and then the following
question appeared: “What is the conclusion?,” to which they
had to write down the conclusion. There was no option of
backtracking through the display. The computer recorded
the answer written by participants.
Results and Discussion
Data were analyzed using non-parametric Wilcoxon’s
tests and all comparisons were one-tailed, unless otherwise
stated.
We computed the percentage of inferences MP, DA, AC
and MT endorsed by participants to determine the accuracy
of responses. Apart from the inferential answers, people
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gave other types of responses as well, for example blank
responses, asymmetrical answers of the kind found by
Schaeken et al. (1997), and particularly the “There is no
valid conclusion” answer, that is logically correct for DA
and AC. The percentages of endorsed inferences are shown
in Table 3.
People endorsed a higher overall percentage of inferences
for A only if B (80%) than for the other kind of conditional
formulations: not-A unless B (76%), if A then B (75%) and
if not-B then not-A (69%). However, there were no
significant differences among them (Friedman ANOVA test:
χ2(26, 3) = 5.13, p < .16, two-tailed). 
As expected, results show that as for if then and if not
then, the difference between MP and MT inferences was
reliable (z = 2.4, p < .008 and z = 1.91, p < .023,
respectively). On the contrary, there was no reliable difference
between MP and MT inferences for unless (z = 0.22, p > .1,
two-tailed), and nor for only if (z = 1.60, p > .05, two-tailed). 
Likewise, according to our expectations, MT for unless
statements were easier than MT for if not then (z = 1.64, p
< .05); the same predicted pattern, although lacking
significance, appeared in the comparison between MT for
unless and for if then (z = 1.08, p < .14). Likewise, MT
inference with only if statements were reliably easier than
MT for if not then (z = 1.81, p < .035), although the
difference between MT for only if and for if then was not
reliable (z = 0.87, p < .19). 
There was also a general increase in AC inferences both
for unless and for only if in comparison with if then and if
not then statements. AC inferences for unless were easier
than AC for if then and for if not then, although the difference
was reliable only for the latter (z = .11, p < .50 and z = 2.39,
p < .01, respectively). In a similar way, AC inferences with
only if were easier than AC for if then and for if not then,
although the difference was also reliable only for the latter
(z = 1.14, p < .13 and z = 3.05, p < .002, respectively).
Concerning DA inferences, a Friedman ANOVA test
showed that there were no differences among the four
conditional formulations, χ2(26, 3) = 5.68, p > .1, two-tailed. 
As expected, there was a relevant percentage of
asymmetric conclusions with unless conditionals (15.4%),
reliably higher than those found with the other conditional
formulations (If then: 2.9%; If not then: 6.3%; and Only if:
2.9%; z = 2.29, p < .01; z = 1.73, p < .05; and z = 2.71,
p < .003, respectively). The highest percentage of overall
asymmetric responses was for unless DA inferences (23%).
Our predictions tend to be confirmed by the results
found. Firstly and most importantly, mental model hypothesis
was almost completely confirmed. There were reliably more
MP inferences than MT ones for if then and if not then
conditionals. On the other hand, there were no differences
in accuracy between MP and MT for unless and for only if. 
The same pattern of almost universal confirmation was
found with the second prediction concerning MT and AC
inferences. MT inferences were reliably more frequent with
unless and only if, than with if not then. Likewise, MT
inferences were more frequent with unless and only if than
with if then, although these differences were not totally
reliable. On the other hand, we have also confirmed the
increase in AC inferences for two-model assertions: AC
inferences were reliably more frequent with unless and only
if, than with if not then. Likewise, AC inferences were more
frequent with unless and only if than with if then, although
these differences were not totally reliable.
Our prediction concerning the asymmetric responses to
unless was also confirmed. We found a relevant amount of
asymmetric responses with unless conditionals, particularly
high with DA inferences, that confirm the difficulty of
understanding and reasoning from this formulation. The
reliably higher percentage of these responses with unless
than with the others formulations replicate prior results
(Schaeken et al., 1997; Carriedo et al., 1999; García-
Madruga, Moreno, et al., 2008). 
As for DA inferences, there were no significant
differences among the diverse conditional formulations.
Therefore, as in prior studies (see, Evans, 1977; Schaeken
et al., 1997) there is no increase of DA inferences in only
if and unless formulations. We will discuss the case of DA
inferences more in depth below. 
Summing up, results tend to confirm our idea that A
only if B and not-A unless B probably lead people to imagine
two possibilities from the outset, and that these possibilities
go in the opposite direction than in the case of if A then B;
that is, from B to A not from A to B. 
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Table 3
Percentages of Conclusions Endorsed by Participants in Experiment 1
Endorsements MP AC MT DA
A...B B...A notB...notA notA...notB
If A then B 95 69 77 62
A only if B 91 78 83 66
Not-A unless B 83 71 85 67
notB...notA notA...notB A...B B...A
If not-B then not-A 86 67 68 56
Note. MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent, MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of antecedent.
Experiment 2
The purpose of this second experiment was to test our
main predictions with a new procedure that allows the
computation of not only participants’ accuracy but also their
response latencies. We changed the task in such a way that
participants, instead of drawing their own explicit conclusion,
had to evaluate whether a given conclusion was true or false.
That is, we replaced the construction task of Experiment 1
with an evaluation task in the present experiment, using the
same procedure as in Wright and Hull (1986) in which
reading time of minor categorical premise (MP, AC, DA,
or MT) and response conclusion was recorded together.
Hypotheses one and two are the same as in Experiment 1.
As participants now only had to evaluate the given
conclusion, the third hypothesis regarding the asymmetric
responses was skipped and substituted by a new hypothesis
concerning response latencies. Espino, Santamaría, and
García-Madruga (2002; see also Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003)
demonstrated the existence of an opposite directional effect
for if A then B than for A only if B: Reasoners were faster
drawing inferences from A to B for if then and from B to
A for only if. The directional effect is enclosed in our
proposed representation (see Table 2) and thus we predict
that latencies from B to A will be faster for A only if B, not-
A unless B, and If not-B then not-A. Conversely, we predict
an A to B directional effect for if A then B.
Method
Participants
Thirty-three volunteers participated in the experiment.
Participants were students of Psychology of UNED. They
received a credit for taking part in the experiment. Two
participants were replaced because they incorrectly answered
all four questions in at least two conditions.
Design and Materials
They were the same as in Experiment 1, except for the task
used. Now participants are asked to evaluate the conclusions.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a single session
lasting approximately 45 minutes. Participants were
instructed about the nature of the task, they were told that
they had to decide whether the conclusions of the inferences
were “necessarily true,” “false,” or “nothing follows.” The
entire procedure, including all instructions, was controlled
by a Macintosh computer. Participants sat in front of a video
display screen on which the written information appeared
in black capital letters on a white screen. 
After having carefully read the instructions and
completed some practice trials, one of the four types (MP,
AC, DA, or MT) of conditional sentences appeared on the
screen. Participants had to read the sentence and press the
space bar to change the display, at which time the
categorical premise appeared on the screen, thus indicating
one of the four (MP, MT, DA, or AC) inference types.
Again, participants, after reading the categorical premise,
had to press the space bar, at which time the word
CONCLUSION appeared followed by the conclusion for
the particular conditional inference (MP, MT, DA, or AC).
Participants had to respond by pressing one of three
different keys: A key labeled with the word “YES” if they
thought that the conclusion was true, a key labeled with
the word “NO” if they thought that the conclusion was
false, and the space bar if they thought that there was no
valid conclusion.
There were no options of backtracking through the
display. Participants were instructed to read each sentence
carefully and then respond to the question as quickly as
possible. The computer recorded the time (in milliseconds)
in which all the keys were pressed and the answer given by
participants.
Results
Data were analyzed using non-parametric Wilcoxon’s
tests and all comparisons were one-tailed, unless otherwise
stated.
Accuracy of Responses
There were significant differences in the overall
percentage of endorsed inferences for the four conditional
assertions (Friedman ANOVA test: χ2(31, 3) = 8.647727
p < .034, two-tailed). The overall percentage of A only if
B endorsements (85%) was significant higher than those
of if not-B then not-A (72%) and not-A unless B (76%),
and marginally higher than if A then B (78%), z = 3.37,
p < .0005; z = 2.41, p < .02; and z = 1.89, p < .057;
two tailed, respectively. Likewise, there were more
endorsed inferences for if A then B than for if not-B then
not-A, although the difference was marginal, z = 1.8, p
< .060, two-tailed. The percentage of not-A unless B
inferences was not significantly different than the
percentage of if A then B nor if not-B then not-A
inferences.
Percentages of endorsed inferential responses appear in
Table 4. It seems clearly easier for participants to make
MP than MT inferences, both for if then (z = 3.18, p <
.001) as for if not then (z = 3.37, p < .001). However,
neither resulted in differences between MT and MP
inferences with unless (z = 1.47, p >.10, two-tailed) nor
with only if (z = 0.49, p >.10, two-tailed).
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Concerning MT inferences, there was no reliable difference
between MT inferences with unless and with if then (z = 1.25,
p > .10), although the tendency was in the predicted direction:
MT inferences seem to be easier with unless than with if then.
However, the difference between MT inference with if not
then and MT with unless was reliable (z = 2.62, p < .004).
Likewise, it seems reliably easier to make MT inferences with
only if than with if then (z = 2.38, p < .008), and with if not
then (z = 3.05, p < .001).
As in Experiment 1, there was a general increase in AC
inferences both for unless and for only if in comparison with
if then and if not then statements. Thus AC inferences for
unless were easier than AC for if then and for if not then,
and this time the former just missed the significance level
(z = 1.48, p < .07; and z = 3.24, p < .001, respectively).
AC inferences with only if were reliably easier than both
AC for if then and for if not then (z = 2.02, p < .05; and z
= 3.03, p < .002, respectively).
Concerning DA inferences, there were no differences
among the percentage of endorsements for the four
conditional formulations, as shown by Friedman ANOVA
test, χ2(31, 3) = 2.68, p < .44, two tailed. 
Latencies
Latency analyses were undertaken by combining the time
spent reading the categorical premise and answering the
question, that is, responding whether the conclusion was true
or false, independently of whether the response was logically
valid or not. This is the same procedure used by Wright and
Hull (1986). Data for the analysis were generated by calculating
medians. Extremely long latencies that exceed 20 seconds
were excluded from the analysis. According to this criterion,
1.37% of the scores were eliminated. The sentence distribution
of eliminated latencies was: 17.24% in if then, 24.14% in if
not then, 27.6% in unless, and 31.3% in only if. Empty cells
were replaced by the mean of the row (participant’s overall
performance) and the column (condition) means.
There were significant differences in the overall latencies
for the four conditional assertions (Friedman ANOVA test:
χ2(31, 3) = 22.55, p < .0001, two-tailed). The overall latency
of A only if B inferences (3.7 s) was significantly faster than
that of if not-B then not-A (4.7 s) and not-A unless B (4.3
s), and marginally faster than if A then B (4.2 s), z = 4.33,
p < .0001; z = 3.48, p < .001; and z = 1.94, p < .053,
two-tailed, respectively. Likewise, response latencies for if
not-B then not-A were slower than for if A then B and not-
A unless B, although the latter difference was marginal, z
= 2.88, p < .01 and z = 1.92, p < .055, two-tailed,
respectively. Response latencies for not-A unless B were not
significantly different from the latencies for if A then B.
For if, response latencies for inferences from A to B (MP
and DA) were faster (3.8 s) than response latencies for
inferences from B to A (AC and MT: 4.7 s; z = 3.10, p <
.001). Conversely, for only if, unless and if not, B to A
response latencies were faster than A to B response latencies
(only if 3.4 and 4.0 s, respectively; z = 3.94, p < .0001;
unless: 3.8 and 4.8 s, respectively; z = 3.20, p < .001; and
if not: 4.0 and 5.5 s, respectively; z = 3.45, p < .0005). 
Time required to make MP inferences was reliably
shorter than the time to make MT inferences for if then (z
= 4.56, p < .001) and for if not then (z = 3.88, p < .001).
Moreover, no difference was found between the time
required to make MT and MP inferences for unless (z =
1.27, p > .10, two-tailed). However, contrary to our
predictions, significant differences between the time required
to make MT and MP inferences were found for only if (z
= 2.97, p < .01, two-tailed).
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Table 4
Percentages of Conclusions Endorsed by Participants in Experiment 2 and Response Latencies (in Seconds)
Endorsements MP AC MT DA
A...B B...A notB...notA notA...notB
If A then B 98 75 78 63
A only if B 94 89 90 69
Not-A unless B 76 86 86 56
notB...notA notA...notB A...B B...A
If not-B then not-A 96 64 63 66
Latencies
A...B B...A notB...notA notA...notB
If A then B 2.5 3.9 5.5 5.0
A only if B 3.3 2.9 3.9 4.7
Not-A unless B 4.2 3.0 4.6 5.4
notB...notA notA...notB A...B B...A
If not-B then not-A 3.4 5.3 5.6 4.6
Note. MP = modus ponens, AC = affirmation of the consequent, MT = modus tollens, DA = denial of antecedent. 
Concerning the response latencies for MT inferences,
the results obtained clearly confirm our predictions.
Participants made reliably faster MT inferences with only
if than MT inferences with if then and if not then (z = 3.15,
p < .01 and z = 3.99, p < .001, respectively). Although the
comparison between the time required to make MT with
unless and MT with if then was only marginally significant
(z = 1.45, p < .07), participants were reliably faster drawing
MT inferences with unless than MT with if not then (z =
1.67, p < .05).
On the other hand, as expected, AC inferences for unless
were reliably faster than AC for if then and for if not then
(z = 2.31, p < .01, two tailed; and z = 4.03, p < .001,
respectively). Likewise, AC inferences with only if were
reliable faster than both AC for if then and for if not then
(z = 3.17, p < .001 and z = 4.70, p < .001, respectively).
Concerning DA inferences, there were no differences in
latencies among the four conditional formulations as shown
by Friedman ANOVA test, χ2(31, 3) = 4.90,  p > .10, two-
tailed.
Discussion
First of all we want to emphasize that results show a
fine match between response latencies and accuracy
measures. Therefore, the main objective of this experiment
was reached. As in Experiment 1, people endorsed a higher
overall percentage of inferences for A only if B than for the
other kind of conditional formulations, but now most of
differences were reliable. Unless, in particular, was harder
than only if, replicating prior results (Schaeken et al., 1997;
Carriedo et al., 1999; García-Madruga, Moreno, et al., 2008)
and thereby confirming the especial difficulty of unless
formulations. Moreover, these results were tightly borne out
by response latencies. 
Concerning our predictions, the first one was almost
completely confirmed. There were reliably more and faster
MP inferences than MT inferences for if then and if not then
conditionals. On the other hand, there were neither accuracy
nor latency differences between MP and MT for unless. For
only if, although there were no differences in accuracy, MP
tended to be faster than MT. This latter result may be
produced by some of the participants giving their response
from a superficial matching with the two values mentioned
in the assertion (A only if B).
The same pattern of almost universal confirmation was
found with the second prediction. MT inferences tended to
be more frequent and faster with unless than with if then and
if not then. The same can be said as for only if MT inferences
in relation to if then and if not then. Likewise, there was also
a consistent increase in the amount and swiftness of AC
inferences with two-model conditional assertions.
Our third hypothesis was also borne out: Response
latencies showed a forward directional effect from A to B
for if, and a backward effect, from B to A, for A only if B,
not-A unless B and If not-B then not A. This directional
effect should therefore be included in the mental model
theory (see Evans, 1993; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003;
Santamaría & Espino, 2002). The opposite directional effect
for if A then B (from A to B) and if not-B then not-A (from
B to A) may be explained as due to the opposite order in
which the information enters working memory (see Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). But,
the directional effect from B to A for not-A unless B and A
only if B demands that mental models are considered as
oriented relations, as Grosset and Barrouillet (2003) have
claimed (see also Espino et al., 2000). The results found for
A only if B and not-A unless B suggest that the determinant
role in establishing the directionality of the relation between
the terms of conditional may be probably played not by the
order information enters working memory, but by the word
that acts as connective: if and unless (see Evans, 1993).
As in Experiment 1, there were no significant differences
in DA inferences among the four conditional assertions, both
in the percentage of endorsements and the latencies.
Summing up, the results of Experiment 2 clearly confirm
our predictions. They also replicate the accuracy findings
of Experiment 1, and reinforce them with latency measures
in the same direction. 
General Discussion
We have tested Fillenbaum’s hypothesis about the mental
representations and processes that underlie making inferences
with unless conditionals. Fillenbaum’s view emphasises the
differences between unless and if not, claiming a close
similarity between unless and only if conditionals. From the
mental model theory, this hypothesis leads to precise
representational assumptions. On the one hand, according
to model theory, if conditionals are initially understood by
keeping in mind a single possibility, corresponding to the
true possibility whose elements are mentioned in the
conditional. If A then B is understood by initially keeping
in mind the possibility A and B; if not-B then not-A is
understood by initially keeping in mind the possibility not-
B and not-A (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  On the other
hand, we suggested that only if and unless are both
understood by keeping in mind two possibilities,
corresponding to the true possibility whose elements are
mentioned in the conditional, and the true possibility whose
elements are the negation of those mentioned in the
conditional. Moreover, our proposed representation includes
a backwards B-A direction rather than a forwards A-B
direction. Not-A unless B and A only if B are understood by
initially keeping in mind B and A and not-B and not-A. 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with
predictions derived from this view. The results corroborate
our suggestion that the second possibility is available for
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only if and unless, but not for if and if not. The results
provide two strands of support for our conjectures: 
1. People endorse more inferences for MP than MT
(Experiment 1 and 2), and MP response latencies are
faster than MT inferences (Experiment 2) for if and
if not. For unless and only if, however, there were no
differences between MP and MT endorsed inferences
for unless and only if (Experiments 1 and 2); likewise,
MP and MT response latencies were not different for
unless, although the response latency for MP was
faster than MT for only if.
2. People endorse more MT and AC inferences for
unless and only if conditionals than for if then and if
not then. Although all the differences go in the
predicted direction, some did not reach significance,
particularly those in Experiment 1. In exp 2, MT and
AC response latencies for unless and only if are faster
than for if and if not. The few anomalies primarily
concern if conditionals and may be affected by the
higher familiarity of if assertions in comparison with
only if and unless.
Our results provide evidence against alternative views
of unless and only if. They rule out that not-A unless B and
A only if B are understood as if not-B then not-A. This view
cannot explain the higher and faster MT and AC inferences
for unless and only if. Moreover, our results also rule out
the suggestion that reasoners keep a single possibility in
mind for A only if B, but in the backward direction B and
A (Evans, 1993; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría
& Espino, 2002). This idea predicts higher and faster AC
inferences as we have found, but not a similar increase for
MT inferences. Moreover, this account assumes that
reasoners should make more AC (B therefore A) than MT
(not-B therefore not-A) inferences from only if and they do
not: In both experiments participants endorsed more MT
than AC inferences, although the differences were not
significant. The same can be said for unless. As we
mentioned before, our account reunites the claim that
reasoners keep two possibilities in mind to understand A
only if B (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), with Evan’s
suggestion that the two possibilities reasoners keep in mind
are directionally sensitive, B and A, and not-B and not-A
(Carriedo et al., 1999; García-Madruga et al., 2002; García-
Madruga, Moreno, et al., 2008). Therefore, according to our
account each possibility or model represents relations
directionally oriented (Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003) and this
direction is probably established from the word that states
the connective, this being if as in if A then B, If not-A then
not-B, and A only if B, or unless as in not-A unless B. 
Fillenbaum’s hypothesis about the meaning of unless
allowed us to make a number of precise predictions, most
of which have been confirmed in Experiment 1 and 2.
However, the results of these experiments may be also
accommodated by a more recent hypothesis proposed by
Dancygier (1998; see also Traugott, 1997). Dancygier
maintains that not-A unless B is interpreted as two different
statements: one claiming not-A and the other expressing the
unique circumstances (B) under which A might occur.
According to this view, the representation of not-A unless
B would hence include the following two possibilities: 
not-A
B and A
From the second affirmative model, MP (A, then B) and
AC (B, then A) inferences may be directly drawn. Likewise,
MT (not-A, then not-B) may be easily inferred since the not-
B categorical premise can be directly connected with the
first incomplete model. However, in DA (not-A, then not-B),
where the categorical premise not-A is presented, reasoners
have to complete the first model in order to obtain the
conclusion. Therefore, Dancygier’s hypothesis would yield
a decrease of DA inferences.
According to model theory, the difference between
Dancygier and Fillenbaum’s hypotheses about unless would
mainly affect DA inferences. Following Fillenbaum’s claim,
we have proposed that people represent not A unless B (and
A only if B) by constructing the two complete possibilities:
B and A and not-B and not-A (see Table 2). Apart from the
directional bias against DA, from this representation we
should not expect a relevant difference between the
endorsement of DA and the other inferences for unless. In
fact there are no reliable differences among the four
inferences for unless in Experiment 1. However, DA
percentages of endorsed inferences are the lowest in
Experiment 1, and reliably lower than the rest in Experiment
2, and these results are also confirmed with latencies: DA
latencies are the highest for unless. Therefore, our results
seem to show some evidence in favor of the incomplete
representation of negative model proposed by Dancygier.
The experiments in this paper bear out the difficulty of
unless assertions. In spite of the intimate relations between
unless and only if, Experiment 1 and 2 indicate that not-A
unless B is not entirely the same as A only if B (pace
Fillenbaum, 1986). In Experiment 1 reasoners made more
asymmetric errors from unless, in Experiment 2 they made
fewer and slower inferences from unless (Carriedo et al.,
1999; García-Madruga et al., 2002; see also Schaeken et
al., 1997). The asymmetrical responses imply a complete
misunderstanding of the meaning of unless and may likely
be result of a sort of superficial bias or strategy. García
Madruga and colleagues (García-Madruga, Gutiérrez,
Carriedo, Vila, & Luzón, 2007) have demonstrated that
asymmetrical responses are given less by high working
memory subjects than by low working memory subjects,
thereby showing its superficial and heuristic nature. High
working memory subjects are able to resist and inhibit these
kinds of responses. 
Our experiments give some further evidence to the way
people think about unless. People usually express warnings
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and threats using unless assertions. However, until very
recently, psychologists have not paid attention to unless
conditionals. The assertion You won’t pass the exam unless
you work harder, conveys subtly different information from
the assertion, If you don’t work harder then you won’t pass
the exam. We suggest that reasoners initially keep one
possibility in mind to understand the latter but not the former.
Likewise, following Fillenbaum and Dancycier, we claim
that the meaning of You won’t pass the exam unless you
work harder is more similar to You will pass the exam only
if you work harder. In the two cases, people keep in mind
two possibilities. We claim that these possibilities are: one
conjecture about working harder and passing the exam and
another about the probable result of not passing the exam.
Our results seem to confirm that, for unless, this second
possibility or model may be incomplete. Dancygier’s idea
agrees with the cognitive-economy principle in mental model
theory claiming that people represent as little information
as possible explicitly (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991;
Johnson-Laird et al., 1992). An interesting line of research
in the future would be to check whether people represent a
second incomplete possibility when entertaining only if
assertions. The idea that reasoners keep a second but
incomplete possibility in mind, would probably account for
the partially contradictory evidence about this second
possibility or model for A only if B (see Evans, 1993; Grosset
& Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espino, 2002). The
comparison of unless assertions with other conditional
formulations in diverse pragmatic contexts is another
interesting line of research on which we are working. In
this line, the subtle variation in information conveyed by if,
if not and only if assertions have been recently analyzed by
Hilton, Kemmelmeir and Bonnefon (2005), in the pragmatic
context of instructions given by a boss to employee. 
As we said in the Introduction, a difference between the
meanings of unless and only if sentences comes from the
counter-expectancy nature of unless. This counter-expectancy
affects the different expected probability of the affirmative
possibility B and A: The probability of the affirmative
possibility of working harder and passing the exam is higher
when using an only if promising sentence than when using an
unless threatening sentence. In fact, the results of both
experiments show that affirmative inferences, particularly MP,
tend to be lower for unless than for only if. The difference in
the expected probability of the affirmative possibility between
unless and only if might be explained by mental model theory
in terms of pragmatic modulation: The activation or availability
of the affirmative possibility would be higher for only if than
for unless. In fact, this difference comes from the different
socio-pragmatic context of using either “promises” or “threats”
and this pragmatic context may vary according to socio-cultural
patterns of linguistic communication. 
The different expected probability of the affirmative
possibility accommodates fairly well with Evans and col.’s
recent theory of conditionals (Evans & Over 2004; Evans
et al., 2005), which includes suppositional values in the
representation of the possibilities in terms of epistemic
models (Evans, in press). The results of both experiments
could easily be explained from a similar two-model
representation for unless and only if. This representation,
however, would enclose different suppositional values for
both statements. Another main theoretical issue posed by
Evans and cols.’s theory of conditionals is the effect of
double negation in negative conditionals (see Evans et al.,
1996; see also Evans & Over, 2004). According to this
double negation effect, MT (A then B) and DA (B then A)
should be more difficult for if not-B then not-A since they
demand the denial of an already negated term (MT: A then
not not-B; DA: B then not not-A). The pattern of results for
if not-B then not-A, in both experiments, seem to confirm
a lower percentage of MT (A then B) and DA (B then A)
inferences in comparison with MT (not-B then not-A) and
DA (not-A then not-B) inferences for if A then B. As for
not-A unless B the double negation effect should affect AC
inference since it also demands the denial of an already
negated term (B then not not-A). In this case, in both
experiments, the AC (B then A) inference tends also to be
lower for not-A unless B than for only if. Therefore, we may
conclude that although the results of our experiments give
evidence in favor of a two possibilities representation for
unless and only if, they do not rebut the main assumptions
of the most recent Evans and col.’s theory of conditionals.
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